U.S. Reportedly Drafting Restrictions on Foreign-Made Inverters: What Solar and Storage Buyers Should Know Now

On June 30, 2026, Reuters reported[1] that the federal government is drafting restrictions on imports of foreign-made inverters, the power electronics that connect solar arrays and battery energy storage systems (BESS) to the grid, over concerns the equipment could be exploited to disrupt U.S. power supplies. The factual record is contested: after 2025 reports of undocumented communication devices in some Chinese-made inverters, the Department of Energy reportedly[2] found “no definitive evidence” of malicious wireless functionality in a review of approximately 30 units, while cautioning that inverter supply chains remain complex enough to create cybersecurity risk. According to the report, the measure is being drafted at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). It would apply to new foreign models of inverters and reportedly could be published as early as this year. No proposed rule has been made public, and sources cautioned that the effort could be modified or shelved. Even so, the FCC’s recent Covered List actions offer a useful template for how such a measure could be structured, and solar and storage buyers should be thinking about procurement exposure now.

A Likely Mechanism: The FCC’s Covered List

Although no draft text is available, the FCC has twice run the same playbook in the past year. In December 2025, following a national security determination by an Executive Branch interagency body, the FCC added foreign-produced drones and drone critical components to its “Covered List”[3] under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019[4]. In March 2026, it did the same for foreign-produced consumer routers. Because the Secure Equipment Act of 2021[5] requires the FCC to deny equipment authorization to Covered List equipment, and most radiofrequency devices cannot lawfully be imported, marketed, or sold without that authorization, a listing operates as a practical import ban on new models.

The template has three features buyers should understand. First, it is prospective: previously authorized models (those bearing an FCC ID) generally remain lawful to import, sell, and use absent further FCC action restricting existing authorizations. Second, it is facially country-neutral. The drone and router listings turn on where equipment is produced, not who owns the producer, with case-by-case “conditional approvals” available from the Department of Defense or Department of Homeland Security for trusted suppliers. Third, it creates a firmware problem: Covered List treatment can restrict post-authorization software and firmware changes, and the FCC has already issued waivers allowing previously authorized foreign-produced drones, UAS components, and routers to continue receiving certain software and firmware updates that mitigate consumer harm. For grid-connected inverters, that issue is front and center.

The European Precedent

The reported U.S. effort follows the European Commission’s April 2026 decision[6] to restrict EU financing instruments, including the European Investment Bank and European Investment Fund, from supporting energy projects using inverters from high-risk countries, identified in industry reporting as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The reported EU guidance also extends to products from companies owned or controlled by entities or persons from those countries, and later reporting indicates that BESS power conversion systems are included. The structural difference matters: the EU restricted access to public financing, while the contemplated U.S. measure would restrict access to the market itself, regardless of how a project is financed.

What Project Participants Should Consider Now

• Inventory exposure. Identify projects with foreign-made inverters or integrated BESS packages in supply plans and confirm each specified model’s FCC authorization status.
• Distinguish authorized from unauthorized models. Under the precedent structure, equipment already holding an FCC authorization is positioned very differently from new models awaiting one.
• Build substitution flexibility. Supply and EPC agreements should address model substitution rights, alternate supplier lists, and relief if a governmental action restricts importation, authorization, sale, or use of specified equipment.
• Document firmware support. Supply agreement and warranty provisions should address continued software and security-update support if authorization rules change.
• Draft to effects, not statutes. Change-in-law and trade-restriction provisions should capture any restriction on importing, authorizing, or using the equipment, whichever agency ultimately acts.

We are monitoring the FCC docket and related developments and will provide updates as they occur.

[1] “Reuters reported” - Reuters exclusive, June 30, 2026, “US is working on ban targeting Chinese energy inverters, sources say” (Alper & McFarlane). Verified syndicated version: https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2026-06-30/exclusive-us-working-on-ban-targeting-chinese-energy-inverters-sources-say. Locate and substitute the original reuters.com URL before publication.

[2] “reportedly” - the DOE inspection finding is reported in pv magazine USA, January 28, 2026: https://www.pv-magazine.com/2026/01/28/u-s-authorities-find-no-definitive-evidence-of-hidden-devices-in-chinese-solar-inverters/.

[3] “Covered List” (first mention, second section): FCC Covered List page: https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist

[4] “Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019” - https://www.congress.gov/116/plaws/publ124/PLAW-116publ124.pdf

[5] “Secure Equipment Act of 2021” - https://www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ55/PLAW-117publ55.pdf.

[6] “decision” ESMC Statement April 24, 2026, “ESMC Welcomes EU Commission Decision: Inverters from High-Risk Countries Excluded from EU Funding” (ESMC). https://esmc.solar/esmc-welcomes-eu-commission-decision-inverters-from-high-risk-countries-excluded-from-eu-funding/?_sp=0000a376-8163-4ef2-a332-cfcdb779a183.